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The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206. Instructions
fo_ _reDaration of FMEA and CIL, I0 October 1986, with changes i,
2, 3, and 4.
The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication
and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and
potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA
results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A
resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided
through additional analysis as required. This report documents
the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and
Tracking hardware.
The IOA product for the Communication and Tracking consisted of
1,108 failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in 298 critical
items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline
(as of I January, 1988) which consist of 697 FMEAs and 239 CIL
items. The comparison determined if there were any results which
had been found by IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This
comparison produced agreement on all but 407 FMEAs which caused
differences in 294 CIL items. Reference Figure l.la.
Figure l.la contains a summary of the quantity of IOA and NASA
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The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
office has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach was a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into componentsand low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
was evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data were documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
approach used in assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor
FMEAs/CILs.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.i Defined subsystem functions
1.2 Defined subsystem components
1.3 Defined subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Defined subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Defined subsystem
2.2 Defined major assemblies
2.3 Developed detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Constructed matrix of failure modes
3.2 Documented IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compared IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Differences were not resolved
4.2 Reviewed in-house
4.3 Documented assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Communication and Tracking Ground Rules and Assumptions
The Communication and Tracking ground rules and assumptions used in
the IOA are defined in Appendix B. In addition, analysis/assessments
were performed on Orbiter equipment only; no ground equipment or -
satellite equipment was included in this document. Assessments were
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SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Design and Function
The Communication and Tracking Subsyst@m consists of all hardware
required for ground communication, crew station communication,
attached and detached payload communication, Ground Command
Interface Logic (GCIL) commands, video, audio, and coded
telemetry transmission andreception, and sta£e yector
updates. See figure 3.1. Electrical power distribution has been
included where it meets the criteria established in NSTS 22206
for evaluation of each individual subsystem. Refer to Figures
3.2 through 3.21 for the location of each ORBITER subsystem and
related Block Diagram. The following specific subsystem
functions are included: _:_ _ _ _ _
i. S-band Phase Modulation (PM) RF links provide two way
communication either direct with NASA or DOD ground stations
or via the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS), for
the following: commands, real time telemetry data, two way
voice communication, teleprinter data, tone ranging (direct
links only), and doppler tracking. Network Signal Precessor
functions are included in the S-Band PM system analysis.
See Figure 3.5.
2. The S-band Frequency Modulation (FM) system provides for
data transmission direct to ground. This FM signal can be
modulated by selectable (one at a time): real time main
engine (ME) data during launch, real time or playback Closed
circuit Television (CCTV) video, real time attached payload
data, playback of Operations Recorder (telemetry and/or
voice data), or playback of payload recorder digital data.
See Figure 3.6.
3. Detached Payload two-way communication is via S-band payload
system. This system provides a forward link (to the
payload) for commands and a return link (from the payload)
for telemetry. See Figure 3.7.
4. The Ku'band system is used for either two-way communications
via the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) or for
radar operations, but not simultaneously. The Ku-band
forward link can transmit commands, voice, and forward 4ate
link either for text and graphics _ _(TAGS) or for DOD commands
via the communications interf_unit (CIr. The _eturn
link provides capability for transmission of voice, _
telemetry, and TV video. The Ku-band system can be used
only with payload bay doors open, during on-orbit
operations. See Figures 3.8 and 3.18.
5. The UHF communication system provides voice communication
between the Orbiter and ground stations, between the Orbiter
and Astronauts on EVA, and distress (Guard) function on the
international distress frequency. In the EVA mode. it can































crewmen, and for transmission of biomedical data to the
Orbiter which can be interleaved with operational data down-
linked to ground. UHF is also used for communication with Air
Traffic Control (ATC) and chase aircraft during landing
operations. The UHF amplitude modulation (AM) transceiver is
capable of operation in four major modes and on four different
frequencies. By selecting or bypassing the power amplifier, it
will operate at I0 watts or 0.25 watts. See Figure 3.9.
The Audio Distribution System (ADS) gathers audio signals
from multiple sources and routes them throughout the
Orbiter. Through these eight audio loops, the crew-members
are able to communicate with each other, with Ground through
access with external rf link equipment, with payloads or
other spacecraft, or astronauts on EVA. Caution and Warning
audio signals are passed through the audio system, as are
TACAN ground station coded signals. Equipment included in
the ADS are the Audio Central Control Unit (ACCU), Audio
Terminal Units (ATU), Speaker Microphone Units (SMU), Audio
Center, and Crew Communications Umbilical (CCU) jack. See
Figures 3.10 through 3.13.
Navigation Aids include three Tactical Air Navigation
(TACAN) receivers operating in a redundant set mode, two
independent Radar Altimeters (RA) for low altitude terrain
tracking and altitude sensing, and the Microwave Scan Beam
Landing System (MSBLS), which is a Ku-band receiver-
transmitter landing and navigation aid with decoding and
computational capabilities. The Ku-band system can be used
in its radar mode for rendezvous operations. See Figures
3.14 through 3.20.
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is provided to support
on-orbit activities. Monitors are provided for the
Orbiter crew to observe select activities. Cameras may
be controlled by ground control or by panel controls.
TV video can be downlinked by either Ku-band or S-band FM.
Crew Equipment/Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) includes
the following items which have been included in this
analysis: Comm Carrier Electronics Module, Interim
Teleprinter, Interim Video Tape Recorder (VTR), Headset
Interface Unit (HIU), Headset Cables, Wireless Crew
Communication System (WCCS), Audio Central Control Unit
(ACCU) bypass, Very Lightweight Headset, handheld
microphone, multiple headset adapter, PRC-90 hand-held
beacon/voice transceiver, and AN/URT-33 RF beacon
transmitter•
EMU TV provides video scenes selected by the EVA helmet
mounted camera. The scenes are transmitted by S-band FM
transmissions to the Orbiter for distribution in the Orbiter
CCTV system.
ii. The GCIL controller provides the capability of controlling
selected subsystem functions in e_therthe PANEL or COMMAND
mode. In the PANEL mode, selected subsystems are under
control of the manual Displays and Controls (D&C) panel
switches; in the COMMAND mode these subsystems are
controlled by uplinked ground commands or commands entered
via the Orbiter keyboards. There are five PANEL/ COMMAND
mode switches to control given functions of the following
systems: S-band PM, S-band FM, CCTV, Ku-band, and S-band































Power Amplifier (2, one encl)














Network Signal Processor (2) Avionics Bay 3A
S-Band FM System
Transmitter (2)




































Panel AI, Panel ML86B,
Panel RI3
Panel ML86B, Panel AI4
Audio System
Audio Control Unit (2, one encl)
Audio 1/2 Power Switch
Audio Termination Units,
Panel Controls



















EMU TV Camera/S-Band Transmtr,
Antenna, Battery Pack
EMU TV Receiver, Video
Processing Unit, RF Cables
Text and Graphics System (TAGS)
TAGS Hard Copier
Avionics Bay 3A
Payload Bay EVA Locations





Panel C3 (S-Band PM/NSP)
-Panel A1 (S-Band FM,
Payloaa, Ku-Band)
Aft Flight Deck


















































MSBLS RF Assembly (3)
MSBLS Decoder Assembly (3)
MSBLS Antenna (3)
MSBLS Panel Control Switches
Avionics Bay 1 (one),
Bay 2 (two)













EAI- Comm data processor,
ant control
EA2- Radar data processor








Panel AI, Panel ML86B,
Panel RI3
Panel ML86B, Panel AI4
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations
Various parts of the Communication and Tracking Subsystem are
located throughout the Orbiter. S-band quad antennae are
positioned on the forward upper and lower fuselage o_the
starboard and port sides. S-band hemi antennae are centered
directly above and below the flight deck, with the payload
antenna behind the upper hemi antenna. (Figure 3.20) The Ku-
band antenna is mounted at the forward starboard sill longeron.
(Figure 3.18) The three TACAN LRUs each have an upper and lower
antenna, mounted in front of the flight deck windows and directly
below that location on the lower fuselage. (Figure 3.19) MSBLS
antennae are On the upper forward nose, in front of the TACAN
antennae location. (Figure 3.17) The Radar Altimeter antennae
is mounted on the lower nose, close to the nose wheel bay.
(Figure 3.17)
Avionics bays I, 2, 3A, and 3B contain the individual LRUs for
each of the systems analyzed herein. Panel controls for each of
the systems are located on the various panels on the Flight Deck,
Aft Station, Mid-deck, and other locations for mission specific
panels. See Tables I and II for equipment locations.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figures 3.2 through 3.4 illustrate the hierarchy of the
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Figure 3.8 - KU-BAND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
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Figure 3.19 -TACAN ANTENNA LOCATION
Lower left quad


























Figure 3.21 - GCIL BLOCK DIAGRAM
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware and
functions resulted initially in generation of 1,039 failure mode
and effects analysis (FMEA) worksheets with 269 being assigned as
Potential Critical Items (PCIs). An I0A and NASA assessment was
made by comparing 697 NASA FMEA worksheets and 239 Critical
Items. Discrepancies between the number of IOA and NASA FMEAs
and CILs prevented a one to one comparison which required
generation of additional FMEA worksheets to facilitate collation.
The final IOA count equaled 1,108 FMEAs with 298 PCIs.
Discrepancies noted between the IOA and NASA FMEA and PCI counts
were attributed to the following factors: different failure
modes employed by IOA and NASA, different definition of
electronic unit and function c0nfigurationsand_ponent levels,
based criticality assignments on a certain element of
subjectivity and interpretation of the NSTS 22206 instructions,
there were omissions, levels of unlike redundancy were different,
determinations as to the extent of units function or effects on
system level f unction were different and contract revision
requiring early submittal missed revised and new FMEA/CILs.
Many of the FMEA and PCI analysis differences and issues could
no doubt have been resolved through discussions with Subsystem
Managers had the contract not been prematurely cancelled. Also
many NASA FMEA worksheets were upgraded after the January i, 1988
freeze so that much of the assessment was made on initial
baseline FMEA's that did not reflect the latest thinking. The
most prominent number of PCIs pertained to loss of output and
loss of all capability to: obtain State Vector Updates, monitor
movement of the RMS, verify payload bay door closure through
observation that payload bay door latches did indeed latch,
perform Ku-band antenna boom stow and verification, maintain
mission support and obtain NAVAIDS data during night time abort
landings at unequiped emergency landing sites.
No analyses were performed on the Orbiter audio system or on the
UHF extra-vehicular communications system (EVCS). Because of the
contract revision requiring earlier submittal of the Assessment
Report, and because no NASA FMEA's on the EVCS were received by 1




















4.1 Assessment Results - S-band PM
The S-band PM assessment considered 247 IOA and 120 NASA failure
modes, of which 50 IOA and 23 NASA modes were found to
potentially cause loss of mission, or loss of redundancy to
potentially cause loss of life or vehicle. Issues resulted on 17
FMEAs with 8 CILs.
4.2 Assessment Results - S-band FM
The S-band FM assessment considered 28 IOA and 17 NASA failure
modes resulting in zero (0) CILs and only 2 issues.
4.3 Assessment Results - S-band Payload
The S-band Payload assessment considered 60 IOA and 30 NASA
failure modes, of which 24 IOA and 9 NASA modes were found to
potentially cause loss of mission. No issues resulted.
4.4 Analysis Results - Ku-band Comm
The Ku-band Comm assessment considered 109 IOA and 42 NASA
failure modes, of which 22 IOA and 27 NASA modes were found to
potentially cause a loss of life or vehicle, loss of mission.
Issues resulted on 47 FMEAs with 35 CILs.
4.5 Assessment Results - UHF
The UHF communication system assessment considered 31 IOA and 20
NASA failure modes, of which 15 IOA and 13 NASA modes were found
to potentially cause a loss of mission or loss of redundancy to
cause a potential loss of life or vehicle. Issues resulted for 8
FMEAs with 3 CILs.
4.6 Assessment Results - Audio
The Audio system assessment was not completed, but considered 86
IOA and 109 NASA failure modes, of which 9 IOA and 7 NASA modes
were found to potentially cause a loss of mission, or loss of
redundancy to cause a potential loss of life or vehicle. Issues
resulted for 5 FMEAs and zero CILs.
4.7 Assessment Results - Tracking
The Tracking assessment considered 71 IOA and 54 NASA failure
modes, of which 25 IOA and 18 NASA modes were found to
potentially cause a loss of mission. Issues resulted for 13
FMEAs and 8 CILs.
J
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4.8 Assessment Results - CCTV
The CCTV assessment considered 455 IOA and 293 NASA failure
modes, of which 150 IOA and 140 NASA modes were found to
potentially cause a loss of mission, or with a loss of redundancy
to potentially cause a loss of life or vehicle. Issues resulted
for 310 FMEAs and 238 CILs.
4.9 Assessment Results - GCIL
The GCIL assessment considered 12 IOA and 6 NASA failure modes,
of which 2 IOA and 2 NASA modes were found to potentially cause a
loss of mission, or with a loss of redundancy to potentially
cause a loss of life or vehicle. Issues resulted for 2 FMEAs
with ! CIL.
4.10 Assessment Results - EMU-TV
The EMU-TV assessment considered 9 IOA and 6 NASA failure modes,
of which one IOA was found to potentially cause loss of life or
vehicle. Issues resulted in 3 FMEAs with 1 CIL.
4.11 Assessment Results - TAGS
The TAGS assessment was combined with Ku-band assessment. No
FMEA was found to potentially cause loss of mission or loss of
life or vehicle.
4.12 Assessment Results - GFE


























Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:
I. RI Integrated Schematics: VS70-740249 (Audio), VS70-740300 (Comm
& Tracking Block Diagram), VS70-740269
(FMSIC Processor), VS70-740279, (FM
XMTR), VS70-740299 (GCIL), VS70-740109
(Ku-Band), VS70-740569 (MSBLS RCVR),
VS70-740129 (NTWK S-Band XPDR),
VS70-740400 (Power Block Diagram),
VS70-740159 (Radar Altimeter),
VS70-740259 (S-Band Antenna
Switch), VS70-740229 (S-Band NTWK SIG
Proc), VS70-740139 (S-Band PWR AMPL),
VS70-740179 (TACAN), VS70-740189
(Television), VS70-740199 (Text and




Comm/Instrumentation Workbook, COM/IN 2102, Feb 1985
JSC-II174, Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Rev. C, Sep 1985
,
Intro to Orbiter Comm/Instrumentation Systems, NAS9-18000,
Oct 1986.
5. KU-Band Radar Workbook 2102, Nov 1985
6. KTJ-Band Comm Radar System SFOM, Vol. 4C, May 1985
7. INCO/Comm Systems Brief, Rev. C, PCN-3, Aug 1983
8. S-Band SFOM, Vol. 4B, Jan 1987
9. Payload Comm Workbook 2102, NAS9-18000, Feb 1987
I0. Audio Systems UHF SFOM, Mar 1985
ll. CCTV SFOM, Vol. 4D, Rev. A, PCN-2, Sep 1985
12. OMRSD NSTS 08171 File III
13. JSC-12820 FLT Rules Sect II





































































- Audio Central Control Unit
- Audio Distribution System
- Acquisition of Signal
- Air Traffic Control
- Audio Terminal Unit
- Caution and Warning
- Circuit Breaker
- Communications Carrier Assembly
- Closed-Circuit Television
- Crew Communications Umbilical
- Commander





- Displays and Controls
- Deployed Assembly
- Driver Amplifier Module
- Deployed Electronic Assembly
- Deployed Mechanical Assembly
- Department of Defense
- Extravehicular Mobility Unit
- Extravehicular Activity
- Frequency Modulated (or Modulation)
- Frequency Division Multiplexer
- Ground Command Interface Logic
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Ground Spaceflight Tracking and Data Netowrk
- Headset Interface Unit




- Intercom Remote Station
- Indicator







- Launch Control Center
- Launch/Entry Helmet
















- Modular Auxiliary Data System
- Motor Control Assembly




- Mass Memory Unit
- Main A
- Mission Specialist
- Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System
- Network signal Processor
- Operational Instrumentation
- Operational Recorder







- Pulse Code Modulation
- Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit
- Payload Data Interleaver
- Percent Full Scale
- Payload Interrogater
- Payload Analog










- Phase Modulation _
- Programmable read-only memory
- Payload Specialist
- Payload Signal Processor
- Push-to-talk







- Random Access Memory
- Radio Frequency
- Radio Frequency Interference
- Remote Manipulator System
- Rotary Switch






- Space Ground Link System
- Strain Gage Signal Conditioner






































- Solid Rocket Booster
- Space Shuttle Orbiter
- Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
- Switch
- Tactical Air Navigation
- Text and Graphics




- Ultra High Frequency
- Uplink
- Voltage Controlled Oscillator
- Voice Operated Transmit
- Video Switching Unit
- Video Tape Recorder
- Wide-Band Signal Conditioner







































Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions






DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
m
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL. i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE)- an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
_GHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(0ps)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and




















MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
O_-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
_HASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear








DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
i
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL0 i0 0¢tober 1986, was employed with the








The operational flight software is an accur_t_
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is .......... by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error





























All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis•
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE" Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
DEFINITIONS,
APPENDIX B _ .............
GRO_D RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
g
m
B.3 Communications and Tracking Subsystems-
-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions I
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the Communications and Tracking subsystem. The analysis con-
sidered the worst case effects of the hardware or functional





Human error (e.g., system misconfiguration by crew or
ground) will not be considered•
Rationale: Possible misconfigurations are out of scope
for this analysis.
Inadvertent misconfigurations (e.g., accidental body contact
by a crew member with a switch in zero-g operations) will
not be considered.
Rationale: Most critical switches have guards, or are
lever-lock type. Possible inadvertent miscon-
figurations are out of scope for this analysis.
Hardware items have been properly qualified, have passed
applicable acceptance testing, and have been properly
installed in the orbiter. Exception: if analysis of
failure history of a part, subassembly, or LRU in the
subsystem discloses multiple failures, that item will be
flagged for special attention.
Rationale: Baseline assumption is that Program controls
have resulted in hardware that is properly
qualified and installed.
The criticality of a Communications and Tracking Subsystem
hardware item will be assigned on the basis of the highest
criticality function it performs.
Rationale: The Communications and Tracking Subsystem
exists to process and route information for
use by the crew and by ground controllers to
facilitate the accomplishment of mission
objectives and to ensure the safety of crew
and vehicle. Worst-case effect from the
loss of capability by a hardware item to

























Loss of all capability to update Orbiter State Vector can
cause loss of crew/vehicle.
Rationale: GN&C hardware and Master Timing Unit
drifts/errors can cause vehicle location
errors in de-orbit and landing operations
that could result in loss of crew/vehicle.
Interconnecting cables will not be evaluated.
Rationale: Baseline assumption is that the program
controls require hardware that is properly































This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 _ Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen





= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :







ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88 ......
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-1001













NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRIT 3/IR CONSIDERS OTHER 3 QUADS AS REDUNDANT WHEREAS NASA
FMEA/CIL DOES NOT ON PREMISE VEHICLE ATTITUDE CHANGE TO USE
ANOTHER QUAD IS NOT PERMISSIBLE, AND ASSIGNS CRIT 2/2. (HOWEVER,
AT PRESENT OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY ALSO EXISTS IN THAT S-BAND
PM SYSTEM CAN USE EITHER TDRs OR DIRECT (STDN OR SGLS) MODE,
ALLEVIATING NEED TO CHANGE VEHICLE ATTITUDE). CIL RETENTION
RATIONALE ADEQUATE IF CRIT 2/2 IS VALID. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA




























NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-22800-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




CLOSEST NASA COUNTERPART IS 05-2G-22800-I. IOA CRIT 3/IR _ ....._
CONSIDERS OTHER 3 QUADS AS REDUNDANT WHEREASNASA FMEA/CIL DOES
NOT ON PREMISE VEHICLE ATTITUDE CHANGE TO USE ANOTHER QUAD IS NOT
PERMISSIBLE, AND ASSIGNS CRIT 2/2. (HOWEVER, AT PRESENT
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY ALSO EXISTS IN THAT S-BAND PM SYSTEM CAN
USE EITHER TDRs OR DIRECT (STDN OR SGLS) MODE, ALLEVIATING NEED
TO CHANGE VEHICLE ATTITUDE). CIL RETENTION RATIONALE ADEQUATE IF
CRIT 2/2 IS VALID. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA BECAUSE


























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-22800-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRIT 3/IR CONSIDERS OTHER 3 QUADS AS REDUNDANT WHEREAS NASA
FMEA/CIL DOES NOT ON PREMISE VEHICLE ATTITUDE CHANGE TO USE
ANOTHER QUAD IS NOT PERMISSIBLE, AND ASSIGNS CRIT 2/2. (HOWEVER,
AT PRESENT OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY ALSO EXISTS IN THAT S-BAND
PM SYSTEM CAN USE EITHER TDRs OR DIRECT (STDN OR SGLS) MODE,
ALLEVIATING NEED TO CHANGE VEHICLE ATTITUDE). CIL RETENTION
RATIONALE ADEQUATE IF CRIT 2/2 IS VALID. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA
BECAUSE 2/2 CRITICALITY IS A CIL ENTRY WHEREAS IOA ASSIGNMENT IS
NOT.

















NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
RED_DANCY SCREENS CiL
ITEM
A B C ......
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[P] CP] CP] C ]
[N] [N] IN] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRIT 3/IR CONSIDERS OTHER 3 QUADS AS REDUNDANT WHEREAS NASA
FMEA/CIL DOES NOT ON P_EMISE VEHIC_AT-TI___TO USE _....
ANOTHER QUAD IS NOT PERMISSIBLE, AND ASSIGNS CRIT 2/2. (HOWEVER,
AT PRESENT OPERATIONAL RED_DANCY A_O EXISTS IN THAT S-BAND












mALLEVIATING NEED TO CHANGE VEHICLE ATTITUDE). CIL RETENTION
RATIONALE ADEQUATE IF CRIT 2/2 IS VALID. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23500-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRIT 3/2R CONSIDERS OTHER 7 POSSIBLE ANTENNA DIRECTIVITY
SELECTIONS AS REDUNDANT WHEREAS NASA FMEA/CIL DOES NOT ON PREMISE
VEHICLE ATTITUDE CHANGE TO USE ANOTHER BEAM SELECTION IS NOT
PERMISSIBLE, AND ASSIGNS CRIT 2/2. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA BECAUSE
2/2 IS A CIL ENTRY WHEREAS IOA ASSIGNMENT IS NOT.
L
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23500-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ELECTRONICS





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .... '
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ N/N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .........
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRIT 3/2R CONSIDERS OTHER 7 PQS_BLE ANTE_A DIRECTIY!TY . .
SELECTIONS AS REDUNDANT WHEREAS NASA FM_A/CIL DOES NOT ON PREMISE
VEHICLE ATTITUDE CHANGE TO USE ANOTHER BEAM SELECTION IS NOT
PERMISSIBLE, AND ASSIGNS CRIT 2/2, ,AG_EKW_TH NASA FMEA BECAUSE






















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23500-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRIT 3/2R CONSIDERS OTHER 7 POSSIBLE ANTENNA DIRECTIVITY
SELECTIONS AS REDUNDANT WHEREAS NASA FMEA/CIL DOES NOT ON PREMISE
VEHICLE ATTITUDE CHANGE TO USE ANOTHER BEAM SELECTION IS NOT
PERMISSIBLE, AND ASSIGNS CRIT 2/2. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA BECAUSE










NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23500-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ ....
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) , :
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRIT 3/2R CONSIDERED OTHER SWITCH CONFIGURATIONS COULD BE
USED TO SELECT ALTERNATE ANTENNA. HOWEVER, SOME REED SWITCH
FAILURES COULD PRECLUDE PROPER ALTERNATE, BECAUSE VEHICLE
ATTITUDE CHANGE REQUIRED FOR COMM MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION_
OBJECTIVES




















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23500-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRIT 3/2R CONSIDERED OTHER SWITCH CONFIGURATIONS COULD BE
USED TO SELECT ALTERNATE ANTENNA. HOWEVER, SOME REED SWITCH
FAILURES COULD PRECLUDE PROPER ALTERNATE, BECAUSE VEHICLE
ATTITUDE CHANGE REQUIRED FOR COMM MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
w




ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-1009 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23500-I NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK _ _-_ _ _
MDAC ID: 1009
ITEM: ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST : A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23500-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRIT 3/2R CONSIDERED OTHER SWITCH CONFIGURATIONS COULD BE
USED TO SELECT ALTERNATE ANTENNA. HOWEVER, SOME REED SWITCH
FAILURES COULD PRECLUDE PROPER ALTERNATE, BECAUSE VEHICLE
ATTITUDE CHANGE REQUIRED FOR COMM MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.





















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
z
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[p] [P]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIRECT COUNTERPART NASA FMEA. CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE THAT

































NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23500-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21210-2
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RF SWITCH THAT SELECTS XPNDR 1 OR 2 RECEIVE IS POTENTIAL SPF, AS
POINTED OUT IN NASA FMEA. ANOTHER SPF IS IN THE SERIES RELAY
SWITCH CONTACTS ROUTING POWER TO THE REDUNDANT PREAMP LOGIC



























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21210-3
NASA DATA:
BA_ELf_=- [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























[ / ] [ ] [ ]














COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE THAT SHOULD BE DOCUMENTED. REFERENCE CAR's






































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOa [ 3 /2R ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
[ ]
[ ]









COMM & TRACK _ _:
1017
S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21220-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21215-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM & TRACK .....
1019
PREAMP PANEL POWER SWITCH









NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































PREAMP PANEL POWER SWITCH





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH NASA FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
[ ]
[ ]











PREAMP PANEL POWER SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA'_ _=_ _,_5
BASELINE [ ] ..............


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21215-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH NASA FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
E ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-2GL21215-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _-_
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:











NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21227-2
NASA DATA:-
BASELINE [ ]






POWER AMPLIFIER STANDBY SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C _._
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AFTER LOSS OF SWITCH FUNCTION, LOSS OF GCIL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL
PA COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TDRS COMM AND RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.












NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21227-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
u RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C


















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] _











HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21200-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]X




COMM & TRACK _ _
1031
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-2PG-21200-I
NASA DATA: r
BASELINE [ ] __






S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER POWER SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 05-2PG-21200-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER POWER SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM & TRACK
1035














RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21204-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND PM SYSTEM MODE SELECTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
[ ]
[ ]













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM & TRACK
1036
S-BAND PM SYSTEM MODE SELECTOR
A.W. ADDIS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF NPSI, NPSP2 DATA XMIT SIGNAL TO TRANSPONDERS IN PANEL
MOD_ COULD CAUSE LOSS OF SECUR_-_S_I_ _Q_NG C_SSiFI_D
CO_U_DS AND DATA. AGREE WIT_ NASA FMEA. NASA FMEA ALSO
RECOGNIZES THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY
WITH
ATTENDANT THREAT TO CREW/VEHICLE (WHICH WOULD BE 3/IR), BUT


























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21204-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND PM SYSTEM MODE SELECTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE MODE COULD RESULT IN PLACING SYSTEM IN SGLS MODE, MAKING
S-BAND PM SYSTEM USABLE ONLY WHEN ORBITER IS OVER SGLS STATION.
LOSS OF COMM WITH ALL GSTDN STATIONS AND TDRS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION. NOTE: IOA CRITICALITY WAS BASED ON WORSE
CASE LOSS OF CAPABILITY FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES. AGREE WITH
FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT, AND ALSO WITH FMEA CRITICALITY.










NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND PM SIGNAL STRENGTH SELECTOR SWITCH









NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from.... __NASA).....
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND PM SIGNAL STRENGTH SELECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







SIGNAL STRENGTH METER SELECTOR SWITCH AND




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







SIGNAL STRENGTH METER SELECTOR SWITCH AND
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )














NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH'24805-I
DAT.A:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND PM SYSTEM PANEL/COMMAND GCIL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS LOSS OF ALL S-BAND PM CAPABILITY PLUS LOSS OF
UHF VOICE, AND RESULTANT LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO UPDATE STATE





































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMTRK-1042
05-6PH-24805-2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM & TRACK
1042
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]
COMM & TRACK
1043
NETWORK SIGNALPROCESSOR, U L SECTION




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT. IOA BROKE NSP INTQTWO SETS
OF ANALYSES - ONE FOR UPLINK, ONE FOR DOWNLINK. NASA ONLY
CREATED ONE FMEA, EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE DISTINCT FUNCTIONS FOR
WHICH CRITICALITIES ARE NOT NECESSARILY THE SAME. AGREE WITH























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21500-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, UL SECTION




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CLOSEST MATCH IS FMEA 05-2G-21500-I. AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B
ASSIGNMENT. IOA BROKE NSP INTO TWO SETS OF ANALYSES - ONE FOR
UPLINK, ONE FOR DOWNLINK. NASA ONLY CREATED ONE FMEA, EVEN
THOUGH THERE ARE DISTINCT FUNCTIONS FOR WHICH CRITICALITIES
ARE NOT NECESSARILY THE SAME. AGREE WITH 3/IR FOR UPLINK. SEE
IOA 1045, 1046, HOWEVER, FOR DOWNLINK FUNCTION.
w













NEW [ X ]
COMM & TRACK
1045








A B C :_
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [NA] [P] [ ]*
[P] [P] [P] IX]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] IN] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




LOSS OF ACTIVE NSP DOWNLINK COULD CAusE MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT
BECAUSE ONLY ONE_NSP PAT_ WOULD _IN FOR INSIGHT iNTO VE_ICLE





































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]




















w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/IR] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ACTIVE NSP DOWNLINK COULD CAUSE MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT
BECAUSE ONLY ONE NSP PATH WOULD REMAIN FOR INSIGHT INTO VEHICLE
SYSTEMS VIA TELEMETRY. RECOMMEND FMEA UPGRADE TO 2/IR, CIL
STATUS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-2!800-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 1047
ITEM: COMSEC




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
- (ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21800-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 1048
ITEM: COMSEC
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT. NASA FMEA ASSIGNS
CRITICALITY 3/IR BECAUSE WITH LOSS OF DECRYPTION CAPABILITY A
HOSTILE COMM STATION COULD COMPROMISE CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY WITH
SPURIOUS COMMANDS. AGREE WITH FMEA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT.












COMM & TRACK _
1049
NSP ENCRYPTION POWER ON-OFF SWITCH




HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21804-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NSP ENCRYPTION POWER ON-OFF SWITCH







NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21801-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SAME FAILURE MODES (e.g., FAIL MID-TRAVEL) COULD PREVENT
SELECTION OF "NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT" FUNCTIONS FOR SELECTION OF
"T/R" OR "REV" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION OF NSP DATA. THERE IS NO
HARDWARE OR COMMAND REDUNDANCY FOR THE SWITCH'S FUNCTION.
RECOMMEND


































NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21801-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NSP ENCRYPTION MODE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SAME FAILURE MODES COULD PREVENT PROPER SELECTION OF "NSP
ENCRYPTION SELECT" FUNCTIONS "T/R" OR "REV" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION
OF NSP DATA. THERE IS NOT HARDWARE OR COMMAND REDUNDANCY FOR THE
SWITCH'S FUNCTION. RECOMMEND FMEA UPGRADE TO 2/2 (CIL STATUS).





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21802-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT SWITCH








[ s /2R ] E P ]
[2/2 ] [ ]
[ N/N ] [ N ]
RED_D_CY SCREENS
B C
[ NA] [ P ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SAME FAILURE MODES (e.g., FAIL MID-TRAVEL) COULD PREVENT
SELECTION OF "NSP ENCRYPTION SELECTION OF
"T/R" OR "REV" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION OF NSP DATA. THERE IS NO
HARDWARE OR COMMAND REDUNDANCY FOR THE SWITCH'S FUNCTION.









NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21802-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




SAME FAILURE MODES COULD PREVENT PROPER SELECTION OF "NSP
ENCRYPTION SELECT" FUNCTIONS "T/R" OR "REV" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION
OF NSP DATA. THERE IS NOT HARDWARE OR COMMAND REDUNDANCY FOR THE
SWITCH'S FUNCTION. RECOMMEND FMEA UPGRADE TO 2/2 (CIL STATUS).
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21803-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK ....
MDAC ID: 1055
ITEM: ENCRYPTION ZEROIZE/NORMAL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ..........
ADEQUATE [ .... ]_
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCH FAILURE BEFORE :_UNCH COULDCAUSE LAUNCH DELAY, BUT
CRITICALITY IS 3/3. FAILURE AT ANY OTHER TIME WOULD NOT IN AND
OF ITSELF CAUSE MISSION LOSS (IT COULD COMPROMISE SECURITY, BUT
THAT IS NOT MISSION LOSS). NOTE: KEY CAN____BE ZEROIZED BY


























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21803-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




BRIDGING SHORT IN SWITCH COULD CAUSE INADVERTENT ZEROIZING OF THE
KEY, CAUSING LOSS OF ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF


















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM & TRACK
1057















[ P ] [
[ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21533-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NSP UPLINK DATA SOURCE SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WORST CASE SHORT TO GROUND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF "NSPI, 2 ON"
SIGNALS AND RESULT IN LOSS OF CLASSIFIED MISSION (LOSS OF
SECURITY FOR CLASSIFIED DATA). AGREE WITH NASA FMEA CRITICALITY
ASSIGNMENT.







NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21531-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]




[ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :

























NSP DATA RATE XMIT SWITCH











NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WORST CASE SHORT TO GROUND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF "NSPI, 2 ON"
SIGNALS AND RESULT IN LOSS OF CLASSIFIED MISSION (LOSS OF
SECURITY FOR CLASSIFIED DATA) . AGREE WITH NASA FMEA CRITICALITY
AS S I GNMENT.
w







NASA FMEA #" 05-2G-21532-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]_ ....




COMM & TRACK _
1061
NSP DATA RATE RCV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/1R] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN BASSIGNMENT. SOME POSSIBLE FAIL]TRE MODES
(e.g., FAIL MID-TRAVEL) COULD AFFECT BOTH DATA RATE CAPABILITIES
AND PREVENT RECEIPT OF UPLINK DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR UPDATE.






























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21532-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NSP DATA RATE RCV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT. SOME POSSIBLE FAILURE MODES
(e.g., FAIL MID-TRAVEL) COULD AFFECT BOTH DATA RATE CAPABILITIES
AND PREVENT RECEIPT OF UPLINK DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR UPDATE.
RECOMMEND CRITICALITY UPGRADE TO 3/IR.
w
i











NSP CODING XMIT SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21534-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NSP CODING XMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




WORST CASE SHORT TO GROUND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF "NSPI, 2 ON"
SIGNALS AND RESULT IN LOSS OF CLASSIFIED MISSION (LOSS OF
SECURITY FOR CLASSIFIED DATA). AGREE WITH NASA FMEA CRITICALITY
ASSIGNMENT.











NSP CODING RCV SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21535-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NSP CODING RCV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE SHORT TO GROUND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF "NSPI, 2 ON"
SIGNALS AND RESULT IN LOSS OF CLASSIFIED MISSION (LOSS OF









NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-22000-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR J [ P _ [ P J [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-22000-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 1068 ASSIGNS 2/IR FOR ORBIT OPS - LOSS OF MISSION PLUS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE FOR FAILURE OF ALL PATHS FOR STATE
VECTOR UPDATE. (NASA FMEA WRITEUP ACKNOWLEDGES THE IR FUNCTIONAL









NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-22000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
• ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE 3/IR CRITICALITY IS ENCOMPASSED IN IOA 1068, WHICH ALSO
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
[ ]
[ ]

















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DAT_A|
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21229-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21230-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )












NaSA n_A #: 05-6PG-21230-1
NASA DATA: ii ___ _ :
















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[P] [NA] [P]
[P] IF] [P]
[ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21228-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21228-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21228-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



























NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21214-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















_CO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21212-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21212-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )



























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21216-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, SI6





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1520




[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [










































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN i, 2 ASSIGNMENTS.
[ ]
[ ]








NASA FMEA #: 6PG-21201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





























RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
RED_DANCY SCREENS
A B
[ F ] [ F ]













(If different from NASA)













































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21203-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI7(J4-45)
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAILS OPEN.
IOA FAILURE MODE; LOSS OF OUTPUT.
LOSS OF OUTPUT TO THE DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSS OF POWER TO THE
TRANSPONDER. THE RESULTS ARE THE SAME. NO DIFFERENCES.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21203-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI7(J4-45)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI8(J4-45)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 J [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI4R3





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







OPEN CIRCUIT; FAIL OPEN CIRCUIT.
FAILS OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21204-I
NASA DATA ....
Bq_SELiNE [ ] - -_






RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI4R4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(JS-Z)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







LOSS OF OUTPUT; OPEN IN CIRCUIT.
LOSS OF OUTPUT.
w













NEW [ X ]
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1534






NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]












(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, (J5-Z)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21205-2
NASA DATA_
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, A18(J5-P)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21211-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J5-T)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )



















NEW [ X ]
C&T/EPD&C/S'B_D
1538
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AIS(J5-T)





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21211-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J5-T)







NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
[ ]
[ ]




NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21211-2
NASA DATA:
.......BASELINE [ _]_i_






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI8(J5-T)
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C - _-
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from _ NASA) ...... ' ......
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21212-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J5-D)




HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
[ P ]
[P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21212-I
NASA DATA:=
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AIS(J5-D)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differen£ _from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21212-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J5-D)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21212-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]_ ........






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AIS(J5-D)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different _{rom NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














































[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
[ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
D
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
C ]
C ]



















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] _










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21214-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI5RI





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














ASSESSMENT ID: _- COMTRK-1550
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21214-I
NASA DATA: :_
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI5R2





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A2SI0





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21215-2
NASA DATA: ..........
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A2SI0





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different_from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21216-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
[P]
[ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA 1555 SHOULD BE IDENTICIAL WITH IOA 1554, WHICH IS CORRECT.
AGREE WITH NASA FMEA SCREEN A, B, ASSIGNMENTS.


















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ F ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]







[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH FMEA ASSIGNMENTS FOR CRITICALITY AND SCREENS A AND B.
w























C 3 /2R ] C P ] [ NA]
[ 3 /2R ] C P ] C NA]
[ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21221-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] _






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP, RPC35




NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]








COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21221-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP, RPC44




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
L_
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21221-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP, RPC35
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21221-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP, RPC44




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1564




[ ] C ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21223-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE II, AI8(J4-127)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21223-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE II, AIS(J4-127)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















FUSE, I AMP, A2F31
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NEW [ X ]
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1570
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A3S12




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21225-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A3S12





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21226-I
NASa_DATA: .... _ _ _
BASELINE [ ] _






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI7(J4-49)
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ ....
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different-from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21226-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI8(J4-49)





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21226-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] C ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21226-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AIS(J4-49)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21227-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POS, A2SII





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCYSCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21227-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POS, A2SII




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )











ASSESS_NT DATE: 2/O8/88 NASA DATA:_
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-1578 BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]







(If different from NASA)















































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21228-2
NASA D_A_T_:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]





[ ] [ ]
[ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:








































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE WITH FMEA ASSIGNMENTS FOR CRITICALITY AND FOR SCREENS A AND
B.




ASSESSMENT I D: COMTRK-1584
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21228-2
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ] _7_ _







LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:














































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE WITH FMEA ASSIGNMENTS FOR CRITICALITY AND FOR SCREENS A AND
B.
w

















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21229-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21230-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]






COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] C ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ / ] ]





































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21230-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2-W, AILR4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-23501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE _ -_ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AIT(J4-117)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMTRK-1591
05-6PG-23501-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1591




[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







LOSS OF OUTPUT; FAILS OPEN CIRCUIT.
LOSS OF OUTPUT.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-23501-2
NASA DATA: ......
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J4-117)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







EFFECTS ARE POWER CONSUMPTION,.
CRITICAL.
INADVERTENT OUTPUT; DRIVER CANNOT BE TURNED
INADVERTENT OUTPUT.

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-23501-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AIS(J4-117)












[3/3 ] [ ]
[NA] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C3/3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









INADVERTENT OUTPUT; DRIVER CANNOT BE TURNED
INADVERTENT OUTPUT.
NOT MISSION OF CREW/VEHICLE
=






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-23502-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.





































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-23502-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 5 AMP, AI8(J4-117)





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
IOA FAILURE MODE; FAIL OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.












NEW [ X ]
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1596
SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POS, A2S5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-23528-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POS, A2S5





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-23529-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [









































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )







OPEN; DIODE FAILS OPEN.
FAILS OPEN.
w













LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SHORTED DIODES CANNOT BE DETECTED IN TURNAROUND OR IN FLIGHT -
FAILS SCREENS A AND B. AGREE WITH CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT AND
































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]


























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SHORTED DIODES CANNOT BE DETECTED IN TURNAROUND OR IN FLIGHT -
FAILS SCREENS A AND B. AGREE WITH CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT AND
WITH SCREEN A AND B ASSIGNMENTS.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-23530-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI9RI




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-23530-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI9R2





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-23531-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] =












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-23531-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21507-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )












NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21502-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1608
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21502-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21500-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































LEAD ANALYST: E. S. DALEY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DISAGREEMENT WITH THE MORE CRITICAL RATING. IOA CONSIDERED
THE DIODE FAILURE MODE (FAILED SHORT) AS A SINGLE FAILURE NOT
AFFECTING MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
w















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















NASA DATA: _ _:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21500-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DISAGREEMENT WITH THE MORE CRITICAL RATING. IOA CONSIDERED
THE DIODE FAILURE MODE (FAILED SHORT) AS A SINGLE FAILURE NOT
AFFECTING MISSION CREW VEHICLE.
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21815-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]_;

















NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [












NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21825-1
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P 3 [ P 1
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)







































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21825-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)

































ASSESSMENT ID: . COMTRK-1619














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ; *
[ ] C ] [ ] C ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] C ] C ]















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21825-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21825-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21825-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21825-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 313 3 C ] [ ] C
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21835-I
NASA DATA :
BAseLInE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















































[ / ] C ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ p ] [ p ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21835-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21835-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21509-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21509-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]_












NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21503-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











NDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21503-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21505-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
























.... BASELIN_[ ] _ _: _
NEW [ X ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ __
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21503-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21503-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R J [ P ] [ NA] [ P J
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24803-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24803-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21543-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES. FUSES ARE INTERNAL TO ARI DRIVERS.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21543-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21543-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES. FUSES ARE INTERNAL TO ARI DRIVERS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21543-I
N_S_ DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )






























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21541-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE
WORST CASE OF LOSING STATE VECTOR UPDATES DUE TO MULTIPLE
FAILURES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21541-I
NASA DATA:r
........BASELI_ [ ......_:_ .....











HDW/FUNC A B C ....
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21541-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE
WORST CASE OF LOSING STATE VECTOR UPDATES DUE TO MULTIPLE
FAILURES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21541-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ NA] [ P ] [
IF] [P] [
[N] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] [ ]






NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21541-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
u
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE
WORST CASE OF LOSING STATE VECTOR UPDATES DUE TO MULTIPLE
FAILURES.
i





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21541-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]




[ NA] [ P ] [
IF] [P] [
CN] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CR_ITICALITy. IOA CO NSIDEREDABSOLUTE




























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21541-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE











NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21541-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE













































NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21541-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE


















BASELINE [---] .... _
NEW [-X ]





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE





































NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21541-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE










NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21541-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE









































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]


















w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE
WORST CASE OF LOSING STATE VECTOR UPDATES DUE TO MULTIPLE
FAILURES.




















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE




















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21544-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_mC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE
WORST CASE OF LOSING STATE VECTOR UPDATES DUE TO MULTIPLE
FAILURES.






NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21544-I
NASA DATA: .
BASELINE [ ]
















N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE
























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21544-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE
WORST CASE OF LOSING STATE VECTOR UPDATES DUE TO MULTIPLE
FAILURES.






NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21544-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A -_ B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE











































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE
WORST CASE OF LOSING STATE VECTOR UPDATES DUE TO MULTIPLE
FAILURES.
w







NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21544-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH 3/2R CRITICALITY. IOA CONSIDERED ABSOLUTE











































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21841-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21841-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21841-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [




] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIRECT FMEA COUNTERPART. CLOSES IS FMEA FOR "LOSS OF OUTPUT."




























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23522-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND FM RF TRANSFER SWITCH







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )







OPEN OR SHORT TO GROUND.
FAIL TO OPEN/CLOSE; FAIL TO SWITCH.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23522-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND FM RF TRANSFER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A .......B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE: RF SWITCH J_z_




























NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-23522-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND HEMI ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)









FAIL TO OPEN/CLOSE, FAIL TO SWITCH.
u
L --











S-BAND HEMI ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NEW [ X ]
COMM & TRACK
2007
FM (HEMI) RF SWITCH ELECTRONICS
A.W. ADDIS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ELECTRONICS FOR HEMI ANTENNA CONTROL IS REFERRED TO IN NASA FMEA
05-2G-23500-I, BUT THAT FMEA REALLY ONLY DEALS WITH THE QUADS
(FOR S-BAND PM), AND IS ASSIGNED CRITICALITY 2R, WITH NO MENTION
OF A LESSER CRITICALITY FOR THE HEMI CONTROLS. SHOULD
BE DOCUMENTED EVEN THOUGH NOT CRITICAL TO MISSION OR
CREW/VEHICLE.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-22900-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [

















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21050-I
NASA DATA: _i_ ....
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND FM POWER SWITCH







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ]
(ADD/DELETE)








FAILSTO TRANSFER, OPEN CIRC_T, SWITCH JAM.

































S-BAND FM POWER SWITCH





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24810-I
NASA DATA: .......
B_SELIN_ [ ] _




COMM & TRACK _ ....
2012
S-BAND FM SYSTEM PANEL/COMMAND GCIL SWITCH





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] CP]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [











































NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND FM SYSTEM DATA SOURCE SELECTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM & TRACK ......
2013
S-BAND FM SYSTE M DATA SOURCE SELECTOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )












































NEW [ X ]
COMM & TRACK
2013




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










ASSESSME_ ID: : COMTRK-2014
NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21110-I
NASA DATA:
_ [ _






S-BAND FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR







A B C ....
J ..
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
_ _C_ _ -_ _
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
NASA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [









LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN CIRCUIT.
LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN CIRCUIT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 7 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN CIRCUIT.






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







INADVERTENT OUTPUT, FAILED SHORTED.
FAILED SHORTED, INADVERTENT OUTPUT.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21001-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







INADVERTENT OUTPUT, FAILED SHORTED.





































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]

























] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21002-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, $3







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] [ ] ,
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN CIRCUIT, SWITCH JAM.
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO TRANSFER.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21050-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, 4-POT._, 3-POS, $3







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, $3







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








CONTACT TO CONTACT SHORT.
FAILED SHORTED CONTACT TO CONTACT, INADVERTENT





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21051-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A2R8




HDW/FUNC A B C _
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FAILURE MODE:OPEN CIR_IT.t ....±±_

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21051-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A2R9




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21051-I
NASA DATA: .......
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A2RI0







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [










































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-21051-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A2RI1







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-25500-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [x]*
] IX]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































PAYLOAD RF TRANSFER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA FMEA FOR THIS PARTICULAR FAILURE MODE. IT IS SPECIFIC TO
THE TWO INDIVIDUAL RF SWITCH LINKS WHICH ARE INDEPENDENT AND IN
THAT SENSE REDUNDANT. REFER TO IOA 3002. FAILURE MODE SHOULD
ADDED FOR COMPLETENESS.
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-23600-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD RF TRANSFER SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 3003 COVERS FAILURE TO SWITCH, FAILS MID-TRAVEL, ETC.
































PAYLOAD RF TRANSFER SWITCH




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 3004 COVERS ELECTRICAL SHORT, NASA FMEA COVERS BOTH SHORT AND
OPEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21300-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]




COMM & TRACK _ _i_,
3005
PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR FORWARD LINK
[ : /:




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WITH NASA FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT. IOA 3005 PERTAINS TO-.
FORWitRD- LINK ONLY, NASA FMEA COVERS LOSS OF OUTPUT FOR BOTH





















NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR FORWARD LINK
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIRECT COUNTERPART NASA FMEA, BUT EXTREME CASE COULD BE
COVERED BY INDICATED FMEA. AGREE WITH NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21300-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM & TRACK _ _ ........
3007
PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR FORWARD LINK






HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIRECT NASA COUNTERPART FMEA, BUT EXTREME CASE COULD;

































NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21300-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR RETURN LINK
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA 3008 PERTAINS TO FORWARD LINK ONLY, NASA FMEA COVERS LOSS OF
OUTPUT FOR BOTH FORWARD AND RETURN LINKS. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA
SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21300-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR RETURN LINK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIRECT NASA COUNTERPART, BUT EXTREME CASE COULD BE EQUIVALENT



























NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21300-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR RETURN LINK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [






NO DIRECT NASA COUNTERPART, BUT EXTREME CASE COULD BE EQUIVALENT
TO NASA 05-2J-21300-I. AGREE WITH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
r .







NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21600-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR FORWARD LINK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


































NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21600-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR FORWARD LINK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21600-I
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]




COMM & TRACK _ .........
3013
PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR RETURN LINK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [

































NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21600-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR RETURN LINK





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24830-3
NASA DKTA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND PAYLOAD SYSTEM PNL/CMD GCIL SWITCH









NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































S-BAND PAYLOAD SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH, S13




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-213013-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 3017
ITEM: S-BAND PAYLOAD SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH, S13




HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 2 /2 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] C ] C ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMTRK-3018
05-2J-213014-2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM & TRACK
3018




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ADD/DELETE)





















NEW [ X ]
COMM & TRACK
3019




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-236002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND PL ANTENNA POLARIZATION SWITCH,S2





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




AGREE WTIH FMEA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.
[ ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-236002-I
NASA DATA: ,
BASELINE [ ]:




COMM & TRACK _-__ _ _ _ _Vnn
3021
S-BAND PL ANTENNA POLARIZATTON SWITCH, $2







NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


































NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21304-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PI TRANSMITTER RF PWR LEVEL SELECT SWITCH, $4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )













NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21304-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PI TRANSMITTER RF PWR LEVEL SELECT SWITCH, $4
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA C 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C x ] *
IOA C 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] - [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21309-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PL SYSTEM XMTR MODULATION ON/OFF SWITCH, $9




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21309-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM & TRACK _
3025
PL SYSTEM XMTR MODULATION ON/OFF SWITCH, $9




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 2 /2 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] C ] C ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21308-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND PL FREQUENCY SWEEP ON/OFF SWITCH, $8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21308-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND FREQUENCY SWEEP ON/OFF SWITCH, $8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] C ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
























NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21615-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







S-BAND PL PSP COMMAND OUTPUT SELECTOR SWITCH,





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )












NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21615-2
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [ ]







S-BAND PL PSP COMMAND OUTPUT SELECTOR SWITCH,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [



































NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21307-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







S-BAND PL SYSTEM PI RF CHANNEL SELECT SWITCHES,




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-2J-21307-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






S-BAND PL SYSTEM PI RF CHANNEL SELECT SWITCHES





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [












































[ / ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :









NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-213015-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3502
ITEM: FUSE, IA




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-213015-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-213016-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A : B
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
[P]
[ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-213020-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [









































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-213020-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-213019-I
N ASADATA: _÷_ _ ....
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/?UNC A B C
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-236005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-236005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





































RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-236005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-236006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] - -












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-236006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-236006-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: E. S. DALEY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ ....
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-236006-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-213018-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/_NC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NaSA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA # : 05-6PJ-213021-1
NASA DATA_
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-213021-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-213020-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [








































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-213020-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-236005-I
NASA DATA_. _ _ _
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
.... ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )

















































NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






















NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PJ-236005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD EA-I (INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION





















NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD EA-I (INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT. STOWED ANTENNA WOULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF KUCOMM OUTPUT.
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5200-I
NASA DATA_ _ :_ _
BASELINE [ ]






BD EA-2 (RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSOR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS : iii
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION' _EN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR _
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION

































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
4002
KU BD EA-2 (RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSOR)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.









NASA DATA_ <'_ _ _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
4003
KU BD SPA (SIGNAL PROCESSOR ASSY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESS_NT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C "
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .............
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED CO_ FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVEREDUNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.
l
U







NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5400-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD SPA (SIGNAL PROCESSOR ASSY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
=
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.













COMM AND TRACK _- ' _ _
4004
NSP (NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.
w







NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.












NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _ _
4006
KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION




















NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.
=














COMM AND TRACK i _?_ _:=_
4008







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. FAILURE TO START/STOP WOULD
CAUSE _SS KTJCO_-_NCT--_ON RE=SULTING IN LO-SS oF OUTPUT. MIGHT































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.
w














NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
COMMAND TRACK
4010
KU BD DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
C ] C ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RAD_ FUNCTION


















NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.
m
m
















NEW [ X ]
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.






NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





















NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.






NASA FMEA # : 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _ ....
4013
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ I ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)






(If applicable) _ _!_z ,_
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






K_ BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
BOOM STOW WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF






NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA: _
B_ELINE [ ]






_==_ BDCOMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 2









NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYS!S ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN!NCLUDINGBOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTION-S CRITiC_L_TY_'IS_IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION


































NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
COMMAND TRACK
4015
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 2
W. C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA: ........
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ..............................
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 2





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
BOOM STOW WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
w












COMTRK-4016 Br_SELINE [ ]
05-2R-5100-I NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _ _ _ ...._ii_ _- _ _ _
4016






NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]









RE COMMENDAT IONS .•
[ 3/1R ]
(If different from NASA)
[P] [P] [P] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]COMPARE [ N / ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM DOn/RETURN LINK MODE 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _i_±_ _L_ i
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. BOOM STOW WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF






















NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 1 CHANNEL1





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
BOOM STOW WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
w
w















NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
COMM AND TRACK
4018
KU BD COMM DOWN/RE_ LINK MODE 1 CHANNEL1
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION




























NASA FMEA # : 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 1 CHANNEL 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.






NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK ...... _
4019
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 1 CHANNEL 2






NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
A B C
CP] CP] C ]
CP] CP] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ;
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.

























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 1 CHANNEL 3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

















NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK ........
4020
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 1 CHANNEL 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED CO_ FUNCTION, WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION




































NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
4021
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 2
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.








NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .......
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA: ?z _i_:_
Sa_EL_E [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _:_...._ _ _ _:
4022
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK'MODE 2 CHANNEL i




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND CO_ FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AG_EMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.
r







NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA: _,_._-
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK - ,:
4023
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KT@ BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. BOOM STOW WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
KU-BAND FUNCTION.
















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK _ _ _ _-:_
4024
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION, _EN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION




















NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU A PWR SW (REF NAVAIDS RR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/IR] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.






NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5112-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _-_ _ii_
4026
KU A PWR SW (REF NAVAIDS RR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
AN_A_LYSIS ONLY _0__COM_4 FUNCTION- _ INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION

























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5113-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU A MODE SW (REF NAVAIDS RR)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.






NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5113-2
NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _' _ _
4028
KU A MODE SW (REF NAVAIDS RR)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION































KU BD SIG PROC HDR SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA n_A #: 0S-2R-S411-1
NASA DATA: ......
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _ ..........
4030
KU BD SIG PROC HDR SW




HDW/FUNC A _ B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _±_. ....;: _; _....































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5412-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD SIG PROC LDR SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)











NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5412-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD SIG PROC LDR SW





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C










































NSP GCIL UPLINK DATA SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. FAILURE TO SW COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF KUCOMM CAPABILITY. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE
STATE VECTOR UPDATE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
MIGHT ADD FMEA FOR COMPLETENESS.















NASA [ I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
4034



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. FAILURE TO SW COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF KUCOMM CAPABILITY. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE
STATE VECTOR UPDATE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.






























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5107-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD A ANT STEERING SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ x ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD PREVENT SELECTION OF OPTIMUM ANTENNA
STEERING MODE. NOT CRITICAL FUNCTION.
w
w











KU BD A ANT STEERING SW
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X] *
[ 3
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _±_ k
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS.
FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD PREVENT SELECTION OF OPTIMUM ANTENNA













NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5107-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD A ANT STEERING SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ D ]
• (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
OPEN/SHORT FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF KUCOMM. ANALYSIS ONLY
COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR AND COMM
FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION COVERED
UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES.











KU BD ANT DEPLOY/STOW SW








CRI T I CALI TY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N/N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































KU BD ANT DEPLOY/STOW SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]







NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. SHOULD BE COVERED IN NASA FMEA.
w

























HDW/FUNC A B C
_ASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOa [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)











































KU BD ANT DIRECT STOW SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. SHOULD BE COVERED IN NASA FMEA.
w





















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















































NASA [ / ]
IOa [ 1 /1 ]







KU BD ANT A PYRO ARM/SAFE SW




[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























COMM AND TRACK _ _ _
4043






NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ I/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I/i ] [. ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































KU BD ANT A PYRO JETT/SAFE SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. SHOULD BE COVERED IN NASA FMEA.
%.-






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24825-3
NASA DATA:







KU BD CONTROL SW (CMD/PNL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSME_:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ _ _ _ _ _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO TRANSFER. NOT cRITICAL FUNCTION. OPEN CIRCUIT CAUSES































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24825-I
NASA DATA:







KU BD CONTROL SW (CMD/PNL)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. SHORT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF GCIL
FUNCTION AND CONTROL OF _-BAND SYSTEM.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24825-2
NASA DATA:







KU BD CONTROL SW (CMD/PNL)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : ......
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. .......sHoRT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF GCIL




























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5415
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TEXT AND GRAPHICS HARDCOPIER




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT
AND GRAPHICS SYSTEM LEVEL AND SWITCH LEVEL FAILURES.








NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5415
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [ ]






TEXT AND GRAPHICS HARDCOPIER
_AD ANALYST: W.C. _NG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ]. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION _TIONAL_.: (If applicable) ........
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKSz
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES CO_R ALL TEXT



























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5415
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TEXT AND GRAPHICS HARDCOPIER
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT
AND GRAPHICS SYSTEM LEVEL AND SWITCH LEVEL FAILURES.







NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5415
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TEXT AND GRAPHICS MASTER PWR SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _,_
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S: ........ _ ..............
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT

































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5415
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TEXT AND GRAPHICS MASTER PWR SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT
AND GRAPHICS SYSTEM LEVEL AND SWITCH LEVEL FAILURES.
w







NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5415
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







TEXT AND GRAPHICS PAPER ADVANCE SW
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT
































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5415
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TEXT AND GRAPHICS PAPER ADVANCE SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT
AND GRAPHICS SYSTEM LEVEL AND SWITCH LEVEL FAILURES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5415
NASA DATA:
BASELIN_ [...... ]






TEXT AND GRAPHICS LAMP TEST SW







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT




























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5415
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TEXT AND GRAPHICS LAMP TEST SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT
AND GRAPHICS SYSTEM LEVEL AND SWITCH LEVEL FAILURES.
i





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5415
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TEXT AND GRAPHICS BRIGHTNESS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT
































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5415
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TEXT AND GRAPHICS BRIGHTNESS CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT
AND GRAPHICS SYSTEM LEVEL AND SWITCH LEVEL FAILURES.
w










COMTRK-4058 BASELINE [ ]
05-2R-5415 NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK ' _ _
4058
TEXT AND GRAPHICS GAMMA CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT


































NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
4059
TEXT AND GRAPHICS GAMMA CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT
AND GRAPHICS SYSTEM LEVEL AND SWITCH LEVEL FAILURES.



















TEXT AND GRAPHICS CONTRAST CONTROL
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXTi






























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5415
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TEXT AND GRAPHICS CONTRAST CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT. NASA FAILURE MODES COVER ALL TEXT
AND GRAPHICS SYSTEM LEVEL AND SWITCH LEVEL FAILURES.
w














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT. IOA ASSESSMENT AGREES WITH 2/2 BUT ANALYSIS WAS




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PR-54050-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6PR-53024-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [x]*
] [x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] E -] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ITEM DOES NOT APPEAR ON CIL, ALTHOUGH RATED AS IR/3. NO
REDUNDANCY FOR CB24 APPLYING HEATER POWER. A FAILED CLOSED
CONDITION WOULD REPRESENT THE NORMAL ON-ORBIT CONDITION.
w



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )














































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT. ONE ANALYSIS EXTENDED FARTHER.
[x]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PR-51053-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC _ A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PR-51051-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. IOA ASSESSMENT AGREES WITH 2/2 BUT ANALYSIS WAS
EXTENDED TO CONSIDER ABSOLUTE WORST CASE OF LOSING STATE VECTOR
UPDATES.
z







NASA FMEA #: 05-6PR-51052-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PR-53055-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DISAGREEMENT WITH THE MORE CRITICAL ANALYSIS.
IX]
[ ]















NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....












































NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO CORRESPONDING FMEA IN FMEA/CIL PACKET.
C ]
C ]
















CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (PYRO JETT SYS A/B)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[3/3
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]














































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




N/A. SEE KU-BAND JETTISON SYSTEM.
[ ]
C ]





















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















































NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C






















NASA DATA_ _ _
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] E ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B













RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




N/A. SEE KU-BAND JETTISON SYSTEM.
[ ]
[ ]

















LEAD ANALYST: E. S. DALEY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]














B C _ _ "
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




N/A. SEE KU-BAND JETTISON SYSTEM.
[ ]
C ]





















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )








































NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:



























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]








[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






















COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C ....
4539
FUSE, IA







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)




















































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]





NEW [ X ]
COMM & TRACK
5001
UHF EVA/ATC EXTERNAL ANTENNA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ASSIGNED CRIT 3/IR FOR FLIGHT (DEORBIT), 2/2 FOR EVA OPS.
DIFFERENCES FOR EVA OPS, BUT NASA FMEA UPGRADES CRIT TO 2/IR
BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE FAILURE IN KU-BAND SIG PROCESSOR THAT COULD
DISABLE BOTH NSP'S, LEAVING UHF AS ONLY PATH FOR STATE
VECTOR UPDATES. AGREE WITH NASA CRIT.
NO
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-23401-I
_N_S_ DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT'.
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [p]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA UPGRADES AIRLOCK ANTENNA TO 3/2R BECAUS_ OF P_-_I_



































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES. (THE ASSOCIATED IOA ANALYSIS DEALS ONLY WITH EVA
OPS - FLIGHT OPS COVERED IN IOA 5004. THE SINGLE NASA FMEA
COVERS BOTH EVA AND FLIGHT OPS.)
w
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-22100-I
NASA DATA:_-
B SE INE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA _A ASSIGNS CRIT 2/iR FOR FLIGHT QPS BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE
KU-BAND SIG PROCESSOR FAILU_ THAT cOULD DISAB_ BOTH NSP's,






































NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-22100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA ASSIGNS CRIT 2/IR FOR FLIGHT OPS BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE
KU-BAND SIG PROCESSOR FAILURE THAT COULD DISABLE BOTH NSP's,
LEAVING UHF AS ONLY PATH FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATE. AGREE WITH
NASA CRIT.













NEW [ X ]
COMM & TRACK
5005
UHF EVA/ATC TRANSCEI_R _
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C ........
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-22100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA ASSIGNS 2/IR BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL KU-BAND SIG PROCESSOR
FAILURE THAT COULD DISABLE BOTH NSP's, LEAVING ONLY UHF FOR STATE
VECTOR UPDATES. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
w













NEW [ X ]
COMM & TRACK
5006
UHF EVA/ATC TRANSCEIVER .......




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA ASSIGNS 2/IR BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL _-B_D SIG PROCESSOR
FAILURE THAT COULD DISABLE BOTH NSP's, LEAVING ONLY UHF FOR STATE

































UHF SIMPLEX PA PWR SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA ASSIGNS CRIT 2/IR BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE KU-BAND SIG
PROCESSOR FAILURE THAT COULD DISABLE BOTH NSP's, LEAVING ONLY UHF
FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATE. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
_z
w











UHF SIMPLEX PWR SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3, [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-22104-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






UHF SIMPLEX POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA ASSIGNS CRIT 2/IR BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE KU-BAND SIG
PROCESSOR FAILURE THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF BOTH NSP's, LEAVING
ONLY UHF FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATE. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.











UHF SIMPLEX POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CONTACT-TO-CONTACT BRIDGING SHORT HOLDING A FAILED PA IN THE UHF
RF TRANSMIT CIRCUIT COULDPREVENT UHFUSE FOR ATC/LANDING OPS


























NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






UHF SIMPLEX POWER SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA 5011 PERTAINS TO THE SWITCH CONTACTS GIVING TELEMETRY
INDICATION. SOME SWITCH FAILURES COULD KILL TELEMETRY
MEASUREMENT, OTHERS COULD GIVE FALSE SIGNAL. NOT CRITICAL, BUT
FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE COVERED FOR COMPLETENESS.
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-22103-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM & TRACK _;_....
5012
UHF XMIT FREQUENCY SELECT SWITCH




HDW/ mC-- A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ _ /1R ] [ ] [ :] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [P] [P] [P] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)




NASA FMEA ASSIGNS CRIT 3/IR FOR AIR-TO-GROUND FUNCTION AND 2/2_
FOR EVA. AGREE WITH BOTH (SEE IOA COMTRK 5013 FOR IOA EVA CASE).
SINGLE NASA FMEA, AND NO SCREEN ENTRIES BECAUSE OF NASA DUAL

























NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-22103-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






UHF XMIT FREQUENCY SELECT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA ASSIGNS CRIT 2/2 FOR EVA AND 3/IR (BUT NO SCREENS) FOR
AIR-TO-GROUND FUNCTION. AGREE WITH BOTH (SEE IOA COMTRK-5012 FOR










NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-22103-3
NASA DATA:
BA_SELINE [ ]






UHF XMIT FREQUENCY SELECT SWITCH





NASA [ 2 /2 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [







] [ ] [ ] [x]*
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF SHORT CAUSED BOTH T_$M!TTERS TO OP_RA_TE ORBITER COULD NQT_
RECEIVED ON 296.8 AND 259.7 MH2, SO WOULD I_SE CAPABILITY FOR
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PB-22107-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, UHF, MNA
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
i
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA ASSIGNS CRIT 2/IR FOR AIR-TO-GROUND FUNCTION BECAUSE A
POSSIBLE KU-BAND SIG PROCESSOR FAILURE COULD DISABLE BOTH NSP's,
LEAVING ONLY UHF FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
w
w







NASA FMEA #: 05-6PB-22107-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM & TRACK .....
5502
CIRCUIT BREAKER, UHF, MNC








NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [F] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




BOTH CIRCUIT BRE RS (CB13,C 18) NQ LLY CU SED, 
(CBi8) COULD FAIL OPEN AND CONDITION WOULD NOT BE DETECTED IN
FLIGHT BECAUSE OTHER (CBI3) WOULD BE PROVIDING POWER TO BOTH XCVR
AND TO PA, SO FAILS SCREEN B. IOA 5502 COVERS EVA OPS;































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






















NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [F] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BOTH CIRCUIT BREAKERS (CBI3, CBI8) ARE NORMALLY CLOSED. ONE
(CBI8) COULD FAIL OPEN AND CONDITION WOULD NOT BE DETECTED IN
FLIGHT BECAUSE OTHER (CBI3) WOULD BE PROVIDING POWER TO BOTH XCVR
AND TO PA, SO FAILS SCREEN B. IOA 5502 COVERS EVA OPS;
IOA 5503 COVERS FLIGHT OPS VOICE COMM WITH GROUND.
w
w















A/G 1 & 2 CHANNEL SWITCH





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
C









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































A/G 1 & 2 CHANNEL SWITCH





NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




















COMMAND TRACK ....... _ _,_
6003
A/G 1 & 2 CHANNEL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 311R] [P]
[ ] C ]
CP] [P]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [P]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /. ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )






















ICOM A & B SWITCH









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]_
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































ICOM A & B SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)




















ICOM A & B SWITCH









NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differen£ from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]



























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































TACAN ID ENABLE SWITCH







NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


















TACAN ID ENABLE SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



















































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]












[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA [ / ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






























[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/1R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]










[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] [N]
(If different from NASA)
C ] C ] [ ]














































NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]












[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
















(If different from NASA)













































NASA FMEA #: 0"5-2C-22201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 7001
ITEM: TACAN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT. LOSS OF OUTPUT, FREQUENCY CHANGE
AND NO DATA ARE SYNONYMOUS FAILURES.







BASELINE [ X ]._
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 7001
ITEM: TACAN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT. LOSS OF OUTPUT, FREQUENCY CHANGE
































NASA FMEA #: 05-2C-22200-2
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 7002
ITEM: TACAN











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE. BASED ON INABILITY TO DETECT ERRONEOUS DATA AFTER SECOND
FAILURE.
w







NASA FMEA #: 05-2C-22200-2





NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT. FAILURE TO SWITCH AND JAMMED ARE
NEAR SYNONYMOUS FAILURES.

















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA: :
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S:
CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT. OPEN/SHORT TO GROUND FAILURES













































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT. OPEN/SHORT TO GROUND FAILURES
RESULT IN LOSS OF DATA.








NASA FMEA #: 05-2C-22212-1
NASA DATA:
B_SE LINE [ .....]_ _












HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMA___KS:
CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT. OPEN/SHORT TO GROUND FAILURES











































[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT. OPEN/SHORT TO GROUND FAILURES
RESULT IN LOSS OF DATA.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO_TERPART NASA NAVAIDS FMEA. FAILURE TO SWITCH IS A















































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
L
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE. OPEN FAILURE REVERTS TO AUTO ANTENNA SELECTION MODE.
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-2C-22214-2
NASA DATA: .....
BASELINE [.....]__ .....







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ........ ITEM
HDW/FUNC ....A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

































NASA FMEA #: 05-2C-22204-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

























NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA NAVAIDS FMEA. FAILURE TO SWITCH IS A
CREDIBLE FAILURE THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR NASA FMEAs.
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-2F-22400-2
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 7010
ITEM: MSBLS





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-2F-22500-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]_











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )







































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[x]
[ ]



















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









C P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-2F-22401-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT. FAILURE TO CLOSE AND FAILED OPEN



































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE TO REMAIN CLOSED IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE WITH SAME
CRITICALITY AS FAIL OPEN.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6PF-22401-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASAi
C / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































MLS CHANNEL SELECT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE TO SWITCH IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
FOR NASA FMEA.






NASA FMEA #: 05-2F-22403-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MLS CHANNEL SELECT SWITCH





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C P ] [ P ]
CP] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-2D-22700-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 2 /IR ]





COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )










































[I/1 ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
AGREE; CONSIDERING THAT INFORMATION MAY NOT BE VERIFIABLE.
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-2D-22700-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] _







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT _ ......ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .......
NASA
IOA
[ i/1 ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] IX]*
[P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] IN] IN] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ........
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



























NASA FMEA #: 05-2D-22700-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE; CONSIDERING THAT INFORMATION MAY NOT BE VERIFIABLE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2D-22700-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PD-22701-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE. FAILURE TO CLOSE AND ELECTRICAL OPEN BOTH RESULT IN LOSS
OF DATA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PD-22701-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [





































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PD-22701-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _ .......
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.


































LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P]
[ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS :
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KUB-BAND RR FUNCTION.
%-.







NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.






























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KU-BAND RR FUNCTION.








NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
....BA_E£INE_[ ]





COMM AND TRACK .......
7028
RR EA-I (INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT) [REF KU




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]- [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONAl: _ (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.






































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







RR EA-I (INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT) [REF KU




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KU-BAND RR FUNCTION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5200-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ _ .......






RR EA-2 (RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSOR)









NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / .] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RR DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY) [REF KU COMM]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KUB-BAND RR FUNCTION.
i






NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RR DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY) [REF KU COMM]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RR DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY) [REF KU COMM]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KUB-BAND RR FUNCTION.







NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RR DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY) [REF KU COMM]









NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
[p] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS. •
ANALYSIS ONLy COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.


























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]





NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
7033
RR DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY) [REF KU COMM]
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KUB-BAND RR FUNCTION.













COMM AND TRACK ..... - -
7034
RR DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY) [REF KU COMM]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNT_RP__ ART_NASA _KU-BAND _9_ FMEA. FAILURE TO START/STQP
























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RR DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY) [REF KU COMM]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KUB-BAND RR FUNCTION.














NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
7036




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 2 /2 ] C ] C ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable),



























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5112-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU-BAND POWER SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
LEAD ANALYST: W,C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
B
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KUB-BAND RR FUNCTION.















KU-BAND POWER SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] *
] IX]
] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C2 /2 ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA KU-BAND RADAR FMEA.
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF KU-BAND SYSTEM.
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.




FAILURE TO REMAIN CLOSED

























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5113-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU A MODE SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5113-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU A MODE SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WIqEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.








































NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
7041
KU BD A ANT STEERING SW (REF KU BD COMM)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD PREVENT SELECTION OF OPTIMUM ANTENNA
STEERING MODE. NOT CRITICAL FUNCTION. OPEN/SHORT COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF RADAR FUNCTION.
m




ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/03/88 NASA DATA: _
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-7042 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5214-1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK :_ ......
MDAC ID: 7042
ITEM: RADAR OUTPUT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.










NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5104-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SLEW AZIMUTH CONTROL SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEMFLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLYCOVERED KU-BAND_D_._CTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5104-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SLEW AZIMUTH CONTROL SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)







NASA C 2 /2 ] C ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5104-I
NASA DATA:_
BASELINE [ ]






SLEW ELEV CONTROL SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGRE_NT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
























NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5104-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SLEW ELEV CONTROL SWITCH(REF KU-BAND COMM)







NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [










REPORT DATE 03/18/88 C-557
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET _ _ l
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-7048
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5105-I
NASA DATA:
BASELr_E [ ]














HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ........
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO TRANSFER OR SHORTED CONTACTS WOULD ONLY PREVENT SLEW
RATE SELECTION. NOT CRITICAL. OPEN COULD CAUSE LOSS OF KU-BAND
































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5105-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SLEW RATE CONTROL SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE WITH NASA FMEA. ERROR MADE ON CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT OR
TYPO.
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5108-1
NASA DATA:
BASEL_E_[ ]






ANT SEARCH SELECT SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONAl: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS. °
































NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5108-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ANT SEARCH SELECT SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5108-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ANT SEARCH SELECT SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)





NASA [ 2 /2 l
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS .• (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PC-22206-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (31V73A4CB58, 61 & 64)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NEW [ X ]
NASA [ _ /3 J
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
7501
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (31V73A4CB58, 61 & 64)
H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ _ [ 3
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
{ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE. ANALYSIS COVERED WORST CASE FAILED OPEN CONDITION.































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PC-22212-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ISOLATION RESISTOR, (33V73A7AIRI, 2 & 3)
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:













NASA FMEA #: 05-6PF-22402-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (33V73AI4CB25, AI5CB24 &




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 05-6PF-22402-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (33V73AI4CB25, AI5CB24 &
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE. ANALYSIS COVERED WORST CASE "FAILED OPEN" CONDITION.
FAILED CLOSED WOULD ALLOW FOR NORMAL OPERATION WITH MLS PWR SW
AVAILABLE FOR ON/OFF CONTROL.
w






















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA FMEA. SHORT TO GROUND FAILURE SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED DUE TO THESE RESISTORS BEING LOCATED ON LOAD SIDE OF
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6PF-22403-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ISOLATION RESISTOR 33V73A8A5RI, A6RI, A7RI




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PD-22702-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A(33V73AI4CB24 & AI5CB23)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6PD-22702-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A(33V73AI4CB24 & AI5CB23)
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AGREE. ANALYSIS COVERED OPEN FAILURE REPRESENTING WORST CASE.
FAILED CLOSED ALLOWS FOR NORMAL OPERATION WITH RA POWER SW
PROVIDING ON/OFF CONTROL CAPABILITY.













LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
NAB A DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ]





[N] [N] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)







* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) =
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ] m
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPAB




























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/1R] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.




ASSESSMENT ID: _ COMTRK-8001B
NASA _A #: 1.2.21
NASA DATA:
_BASELINE [ ]...........












NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMP_ [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/IR] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU CQULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFO_ CC_ _NCTION COULD P_vENT _S STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY _OR _TCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
_HICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CC_ REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA C_W
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR C_W USUAL INSPECTION AND _S _

























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.






NASA FMEA #: 1.2.23
NASA DATA:
B_SELINE [ ]








LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
_ITI_LITY RED_DANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C __ _ _
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
ix]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
-[ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLI_ CC_ RED_DANCY EXISTS VIA CREW _
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND _S






























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
C 3 /2R ] C P ] [ P ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]- [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ]. [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVER _ ALL VSU _CTIONS. ONL_ TH_WQR_T _ASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED. ........
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS

































NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]

























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8001
ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
NASA
IOA
[ 313 ] [ ]
[ 211R] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED. : _z=_:{_ _ _ _ _'_i i_7-_
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS















































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
L














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK ..... _ ....
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
k
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS




























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.






NASA FMEA #: 1.2.11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS



























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W. C • LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.








NASA FMEA #: 1.2.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




COMM AND TRACK _ _
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT







A B C _ ......_
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ ] [ ] *
[p] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS





























LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]_











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS








































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
r ,
m






NASA FMEA #: 1.2.17
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8001
ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / ] [ ] E ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS

























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.19
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
w







NASA FMEA #: 1.2.20
NASA DATA[ _
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS










































NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF










NASA FMEA #: 1.2.18
NASA DATA: _
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO_OFIVCU COULD RESULTIN LOSS OF CCTV ANDMISSI_N. IIIILOSE OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF


























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.21
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTVREDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
w
w







NASA FMEA #: 1.2.22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE-[ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .........._
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF


























NASA FMEA #: 1.2.23
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
=
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
w





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.1
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ _ ] -







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [P] [ ]*
[P] [P] [P] [x]_
CO.ARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ..........................
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. I_DSS OF OUTPUT C0YERS
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